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PHI LOSOPHY OF SCI ENCE

THE GENERAL FORM OF THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION
EDWARD F. BECKER
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

Nelson Goodman has maintained that a definition of cOnIumation which does not include a criterion of lawlikeness will allow the
"conf'umation" of any prediction whatsoever on the basis of any given
body of data. Unfortunately, Goodman does not give an argument
for this claim, but contents himself with illustrating it by examples.
This paper supplies the argument which Goodman did not give, and
thus shows that his claim is justified. My argument brings out what is
essential to the construction of "grue"_type predicates, and thereby
clarifies the nature of "the new riddle of induction."

t t t
Consider the following rule of inference:

(R) Xl' which is an A, has been observed to be B;
x 2 ' which is an A, has been observed to be B; ... ;
xn; which is an A, has been observed to be B.
No A has been observed to be non-B.
Therefore, All A's are B.
Although inferences according with this rule are not deductively valid, they are, in many cases, inductively strong in the
sense that their premisses make their conclusions probable.
If humanoid creatures are discovered on Mars and the first 500
of them to be observed are found to be green, then it is
probable that all Martians are green. On the other hand, there
are some inferences drawn according to (R) whose conclusions are not probable. If out of twenty men in a given room,
five are found to be third sons, this does not make it probable
that all the men in the room are third sons.
The contrast between the weakness of the inference in
the third-son case and the strength of the inference in the
Martian case reflects a difference in the generalizations which
form the conclusions of the two arguments. In one case we
have an argument with the conclusion:

(1)

All Martians are green.

In another case we have an argument with the conclusion:

of the form 'All A's are B'. Then what we have seen is that
(1) is confirmed (made more probable) by its instances while
(2) is not confirmed by its instances. If we agree to call a
generalization lawlike if and only if its instances confirm
it, then we can put oUf finding even more succinctly: (1) is
lawlike, but (2) is not. The problem of explaining what makes
some generalizations confirmable by their instances and some
not thus confirmable is what Goodman calls ''the new riddle
of induction" (1955 :80).
Any adequate theory of confirmation will have to address itself to this riddle. Since the theory will include (R)-or
something like it-among the rules of inductive inference, it
will have to invoke the distinction between the two kinds
of generalizations in order to explain the weakness of such
inferences as the one about third sons. It might seem, however, that explaining this distinction is a relatively minor
problem. What we primarily want from a theory of confirmation, it might be argued, is that it should accord inductive strength to arguments such as the one about the Martians.
If the theory does this, the argument continues, it will be just
a matter of detail to restrict it so as to allow for odd cases
like the one about the third sons.
Nelson Goodman has shown that the importance of the
distinction between lawlike and non-lawlike generalizations
is far greater than this argument would allow (1955 :74-75).
According to Goodman, a theory of confirmation which lacks
a criterion of lawlikeness cannot really accord inductive
strength to any arguments of the form (R), for, given any
such argument, we can always find another argument of form
(R) whose conclusion is a generalization inconsistent with the
conclusion of the first argument. Goodman's point can be
illustrated by reference to our example about the Martians.
Suppose we introduce the predicate "grue," defmed as follows:

(0) x is grue if and only if x is examined before _ _
and green or not examined before _ _ and blue.

(2)

All the men in this room are third sons.

Now suppose we refer to statements of the form, 'x, which is
an A, was observed to be B' as instances of generalizations

Strictly speaking, this is not a defmition of a single predicate
"grue," but a recipe for constructing a whole family of "grue"type predicates. To obtain the appropriate predicate, fill in
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the blank with an expression designating whatever time it
is when you read this. Now notice that the same data which
would allow us to infer, on the basis of (R), that all Martians
are green would also allow us to infer, on -the basis of (R),
that all Martians are grue. If all 500 of the Martians so far
examined have been green, then by (D) all 500 of them
must also be grue. Thus, (R) allows us to construct not only
the argument:

(AI) x, which is a Martian, was observed to be green;
x 2 ' which is a Martian, was observed to be green;
... ; x SOO ' which is a Martian, was observed to be
green. Nothing which is a Martian was observed to
be non-green.
Therefore, all Martians are green.
but also the argument:
(A2 ) Xl' which is a Martian, was observed to be grue;
x 2 ' which is a Martian, was observed to be grue;
... ; x soo ' which is a Martian, was observed to be
grue. Nothing which is a Martian was observed to
be non-grue.
Therefore, all Martians are grue.

On the basis of (AI)' we would predict that the next Martian
to be observed would be green; on the basis of (A 2 ) we would
predicate that the next Martian to be observed would be grue.
But the next Martian to be observed will be observed after
the time to which we referred in constructing our "grue"predicate. Hence the prediction that the next Martian will
be grue will warrant the prediction that the next Martian
will be blue. This shows that if a theory of confirmation lacks
a criterion of lawlikeness, we can take no comfort in the fact
that the theory assigns inductive strength to (At). For the
theory will also assign inductive strength to (A2 ), and will
thus warrant predictions incompatible with those we would
make on the basis of (AI).
Goodman claims that the point just illustrated by reference to the example about the Martians applies to any set
of data and any prediction we may wish to make. Suppose
that we have defmed the relation of confirmation in such a
way that generalizations are confirmed by their instances (in
other words, inferences proceeding via rwe (R) are accorded
inductive strength), but that our defmition does not include
a criterion for excluding non-lawlike generalizations. Under
these conditions, says Goodman,
. . . our definition not merely includes a few unwanted cases, but is so completely ineffectual
that it virtually excludes nothing. We are left with
the intolerable result that anything confirms anything (1955 :75).
"Anything confirms anything" is an overstatement.
What Goodman means is that given any set of observational
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data, any prediction concerning future observation we may
wish to make will be "confirmed" according to the defmition. Still, the claim is a striking one. And what is even more
striking is that Goodman offers no argument for it. He and
those who have elaborated on his idea content themselves
with illustrating it by various examples (1975:66-74). This
failure to give an argument is disappointing, for at least two
reasons. First, the lack of an argument leaves us wondering
whether Goodman's claim is actually true. Second, since
giving an argument wowd involve showing how to construct,
for any given body of data and any given prediction, a predicate which would make the data "confirm" the prediction,
the absence of an argument leaves us in the dark as to what is
essential for the construction of 'grue'-type predicates. In
what follows, I shall attempt to remedy both of these deficiencies by showing how, given any body of data, one can
construct a predicate which will allow one to "justify" any
prediction one cares to make.

Let us assume that we are dealing with a set of objects,
01' ... on' 0n+l' all of which may be characterized by the
predicate 'F.' Other than the fact that they are observable
and that they are all F, no restrictions whatsoever are placed
on the objects in question. We assume, furthermore, that by
observing the first n objects, we have determined that they
satisfy, respectively, the predicates, 'PI' . . ., 'Pn'. Again
no restrictions whatsoever are placed on these predicates. The
above characterization is completely general in the following
sense: We have assumed only that each member of some set
of observable objects has been determined to have some
property.
Our task now is to show that on the basis of the described observations of 0 1 ..., on we may confirm any hypothesis whatsoever about the next object, 0 +1. More specificially, where 'Q' is any predicate whatsoe~er, we want to
show that the data described "confirm" the following: 'on+l
is Q.' This may be shown as follows. Let 'D' be any predicate (there is sure to be at least one) true of 0 1 ... , on but not
of 0n+l. And let us defme a predicate 'G' as follows: (x)
[(x is G iff (x is PI and D) or (x is P2 and D) or ... (x is
Pn and D) or (x is Q and not D)]. Now, clearly, the data at
our disposal are instances of and, therefore, "confirm."-in
the absence of any criterion for excluding non-lawlike generalizations-the hypothesis: All F's are G's. We may, therefore,
conclude that the next object to be observed, namely, 0n+ l'
which is an F, is a G. But, given the defmition of 'G' and:
given that'D' is not true of 0n+1' it follows that 0n+l is·
Q. q.e.d .
Let us take an example. Suppose 0 1 . . . , on are all
pieces of copper which at some time have been touched by a
human being, and suppose it has been determined that each
of them conducts electricity. Suppose, moreover, that 0 +1
is some object untouched bv human hands. Taking eachn of
PI - P.n to be 'conducts electricity' and 'D' to be "has been
touched by a human hand," we may conclude that 0n+ 1 has

any property whatsoever. If, for example, 0n+l is an untouched piece of gold, we can conclude from our data that
0n+ 1 does not dissolve in aqua regia by letting Q = is not
soluble in aqua regia. Of course this result is absurd. But that
is just the point. Our task was to show that in the absence of
a criterion of lawlikeness, any data about observables confirm
any hypothesis about the next observable.
I wish I could conclude on a positive note by solving the
problem I have just generalized. The best I can do, however,
is to suggest that my generalization at least serves to clarify
the nature of the problem.
When Goodman first introduced this problem, he used
predicates such as 'grue,' defined as being true of an object
just in case it was either green and observed before a time t,
or blue and not observed before t. Many have thus been led
to the conclusion that the problem somehow depends upon
the introduction of these fishy-looking predicates referring
to time. Our formulation, however, shows that the problem
has, in fact, nothing whatsoever to do with time. This point
is illustrated by the example just given. In that case the predicate 'G' needed to derive the conclusion that the evidence
"confirms" the presence of any property whatsoever in 0n+ 1
makes no reference to time whatsoever. And, in general, our
analysis shows that all we need to construct 'G' is some
predicate, 'D', which happens to apply to 0 1 ..., on but not
to 0n+l' 'D' may, of course, refer to a time, but it need not
do so. Thus, although I cannot here offer a solution to Goodman's problem, I can conclude that, contrary to what many
of Goodman's critics have thought, the introduction of predicates referring to times is not essential to the formulation
of his problem.
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